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³<HV, WKHFHQVXV´ The 2011 UK Referendum Campaign on the  
   Alternative Vote. 
 
David Seawright 
School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK. 
E-mail: d.seawright@leeds.ac.uk 
 
Abstract For the Liberal Democrats, the debacle that was the AV Referendum campaign 
engendered demands from within the party for an official investigation into what was termed a 
µOLYLQJQLJKWPDUH¶+RZHYHUXWLOLVLQJLeDXF¶VFRQFHSWXDOPDSRIWKHHOHPHQWVLQYROYHGLQD
referendum campaign, in particular the role of the official groups, political parties, their leaders 
and the media, this article examines the AV Referendum campaign of 2011 and demonstrates 
that it was always likely that such a campaign would mirror the partisan bias found at that time. 
Thus, with a concomitant conservative bias towards the status quo for such plebiscitary 
questions, it shows that it should also have been obvious, not least to the Liberal Democrat party, 
that the goal of electoral reform, as refracted through such a referendum campaign, was doomed 
from the outset.  
 
Keywords: Alternative Vote; referendum campaigns; coalition government; David Cameron; 
Nick Clegg; Ed Miliband 
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Introduction 
 
With just five full days of campaigning left before the actual Referendum on the Alternative 
Vote (AV), Evan Davis, the BBC Radio 4 Today presenter, asked a young group present at a 
µ<HVWR)DLUHU9RWHV¶campaign event if they knew what WKHµ<HV¶VWLFNHUVthey had been given 
VWRRGIRUDQGZDVJLYHQWKHUHSO\µ<HVWKHFHQVXV¶ (BBC Radio 4, 30 April 2011). In fact, there 
was a similarity with the colour scheme used by the group advocating a Yes vote in the AV 
referendum and for the Governmental census of that spring. However, this amusing exchange 
merely emphasised the lack of traction of such an issue for the British voting public and neatly 
encapsulated the less than compelling impact of the referendum campaign. On the day of the 
vote itself The Times considered the campaign µGLVPDOGLVDSSRLQWLQJDQGGLVKRQHVW¶DQGZent on 
WRVD\µ7KHUHIHUHQGXPRIZDVDQLPSRUWDQWDUJXPHQWDERXWWKHIXWXUHRIWKHQDWLRQ7KH
referendum of 2011 has been a local dispute among political obsessives with precious little 
SXUFKDVHRQWKHSXEOLF¶ (5 May 2011).  
 
Thus, on that Thursday, 5 May 2011, we had the second UK nationwide referendum campaign in 
British history. The first concerned the geo-political and economic future of the UK with its 
question of remaining within the European Community/Common Market (Butler and Kitzenger, 
1975). The second, the referendum on µthe parliamentary voting system (PVS) for the UK 
Parliament¶ but more commonly referred to as the AV referendum, would not have such 
momentous constitutional implications and the turnout of 42.2 per cent, compared to that of 64.5 
per cent in 1975, was an indication of the level of concern shown with a question of whether the 
µDOWHUQDWLYHYRWH¶VKRXOGUHSODFHWKHµILUst past the post )373¶system to elect MPs to the House 
of Commons. However, both referendums were promulgated for party political reasons and both 
were to be µJRYHUQPHQWLQVSLUHG¶7KHILUVWZDVSURSRVHGE\WKH/DERXUJRYHUQPHQWof the day 
as a remedy against the disintegration of the Cabinet and with it the possibility of the Labour 
party following suit. In contrast, the second was to allow for the formation of a government and 
one which would see a coalition of the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats. The 
coalition programme of May 2010 included the commitment to seek the opinion of the people on 
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such electoral reform and the necessary Act of Parliament received royal assent on the 16 
February 2011. Unlike 1975, this Referendum would not be µFRQVXOWDWLYH¶EXWµSRVWOHJLVODWLYH¶ 
and would be binding upon Parliament; no doubt indicative of the level of trust to be found 
between the coalition parties on the subject, which would indeed become a prominent aspect of 
the campaign. Royal assent also triggered Electoral Commission oversight of the campaign 
under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) and the on the 18 
March the &RPPLVVLRQGXO\GHVLJQDWHGµ<HVWR)DLUHU9RWHV¶DQGµNo to AV¶ DVWKHWZRµOHDG 
campaign groups¶ (HM Government, 2011; Electoral Commission, 2011a).  
 
This article examines both these official campaign groups as major actors in the 2011 
Referendum campaign but of course not in isolation from the other key actors, particularly those 
of the political parties, their leaders and the media. The first section utilises the conceptual map, 
as developed by LeDuc (for example, see LeDuc, 2002; 2007), to place such political elements 
of a referendum campaign in theoretical context. In short, this conceptual approach allows us to 
discern the extent to which the referendum topic will be judged on its merits or simply reflect the 
political battles inherent within an extant party divide. With this conceptual map in mind we see 
in section two the overly partisan bias of the official groups and their political affinity, in terms 
of personnel and approach, to the relevant Liberal Democrat and Conservative party positions. 
With coalition battle wounds so sensitive, open and raw on the AV question the position of the 
Labour party and the labour movement would be pivotal, and section three examines this 
position or more accurately the lack of it. Section four analyses the crucial role of the media in 
what became a campaign of the disaffected and disengaged; with its negative and cynical 
dynamic contributing to two thirds of the voters (67.9 per cent) rejecting the proposal to change 
the electoral system. But, first we begin by placing the camSDLJQLQµWKHRUHWLFDOFRQWH[W¶ 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Political Elements in Theoretical Context 
 
One would expect a referendum campaign to differ markedly from that of a general election as 
the broad theme of the referendum campaign is defined a priori in the question put to the 
electorate; in this instance whether to adopt the Alternative Vote or to stick with the Single 
Member Plurality System (commonly known as First Past The Post). However, despite the 
apparent simplistic nature of the referendum vote (Yes or No), the campaign can often be as 
multi-faceted as a general election campaign with emerging sub-issues and tussles over issue 
ownership; to the extent that the question becomes entangled with other political factors, such as 
government popularity or the state of the economy, and as such takes on the characteristics of a 
µVHFRQGRUGHU¶HOHFWLRQ (de Vreese and Semetko, 2004, pp. 174 and 3; LeDuc, 2007, p. 38). A 
fundamental question therefore arises of the extent of that entanglement. Is the campaign merely 
reflecting predisposed positions found in societal cleavages, party ideology and party policy or 
does the issue entail such a level of cross cutting properties that can make cues from the political 
parties either seem ambiguous or even redundant? If the latter, then one may expect a greater 
degree of volatility and uncertainty in a referendum campaign, with the campaign itself critical to 
the determination of the outcome. To address such questions LeDuc (2002, pp. 145-162) 
developed a conceptual map on which the familiar variables of an election campaign were 
rearranged to fit the more widely varying context of referendum voting and these elements have 
been adapted here, as set out in Figure 1, to reflect the major elements of the AV referendum.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
In short, LeDuc argues that the closer a particular referendum campaign involves the elements 
moving towards the left hand side of Figure 1, the more foreseeable the outcome should be and 
the more limited (or reinforcing) the effects of the campaign. In contrast the more one moves 
along the continuum towards its right hand side, the greater the potential for volatility and the 
more unpredictable the outcome (ibid, p. 147). :HVKDOOVHHWKDWµWKHHOHPHQWV¶LQWKH$9
Referendum strongly suggested µreinforcement not change¶DQGthe more the campaign 
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progressed the further the movement was towards the left hand side of the continuum, with the 
debate increasingly being seen to reflect the concerns of the political parties. Indeed, as we shall 
see, E\WKHµKRWSKDVH¶RIWKHFDPSDLJQWKDWLVby its final month (de Vreese and Semetko, 2004, 
pp. 99 and 129), the media amplified the increasing political cynicism and negativity of the 
campaign groups and political parties and there is a substantial body of research to show that if 
the direction of movement in a campaign is negative then this benefits the No side who do not so 
much have to make a coherent positive case as to raise doubts and suspicions about the 
arguments being put forward by the Yes side in order to succeed (LeDuc, 2007, p. 32). 
Concomitantly, allied to such an advantage for the No side is the critique that referendums are 
LQVWUXPHQWVRIµFRQVHUYDWLVP¶DQGWKXVwill more often than not favour the status quo (Butler and 
Ranney, 1978, p. 219; 1994, p. 259). In the sections below, we see that these theoretical concerns 
underpin the examination of the crucial elements in the AV Referendum campaign, namely those 
in bold in Figure 1; the official campaign groups, the political parties; their leaders and the 
media, or more accurately the role of the press in the campaign. 
 
However, before examining these crucial elements, we should note here the relevance of the 
ideological and core belief systems in Figure 1. The Labour party had flirted with changes to the 
electoral system since its inception in the early part of the twentieth century with the most recent 
being a proposal put forward for AV LQWKHODVWZHHNVRI*RUGRQ%URZQ¶V administration. Seen 
as a cynical electoral ploy, the Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg wanted no part in accepting 
these µFUXPEVIURPWKH/DERXUWDEOH¶ and aOWKRXJKKHYLHZHG$9DVDµEDE\VWHSLQWKHULJKW
GLUHFWLRQ¶KHVWDWHGWKDW µ,DPQRWJRLQJWRVHWWOHIRUDPLVHUDEOHOLWWOHFRPSURPLVHWKUDVKHGRXW
E\WKH/DERXUSDUW\¶ (Helm, 2011)7KHUHIUDLQRIµDmiserablHOLWWOHFRPSURPLVH¶would 
subsequently permeate every aspect of the campaign. Liberal Democrats did indeed have an 
ideological core belief in electoral reform but this was for proportional representation. The 
Conservatives held a similar core belief in the status quo and often utilised the 1931 Churchill 
quote to claim that under AV, HOHFWLRQVZRXOGEHGHFLGHGE\WKHµPRVWZRUWKOHVVYRWHVJLYHQIRU
WKHPRVWZRUWKOHVVFDQGLGDWHV¶ (Warsi, 2011). Thus, the AV referendum that ZDVWRµVHDOWKH
GHDO¶IRU a coalition government was between a party who did not believe in it but would take a 
µEDE\VWHSLQWKHULJKWGLUHFWLRQ¶DQGDSDUW\WKDWZDVRYHUZKHOPLQJO\DJDLQVWEXWin return would 
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advantageously obtain a reduction in the number of MPs in the House of Commons (to 600) 
through the creation of fewer and more equal sized constituencies; with both sides of the 
coalition being free to campaign for their respective positions (HM Govt, 2010, p. 27). This then 
was the backdrop as the different µHOHPHQWV¶HQJDJHGLQWhe 2011 referendum campaign and the 
following section examines the official campaign groups in relation to the role of the 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. 
 
Designated Malevolence: the Coalition at War 
 
The quid pro quo of the coalition deal on AV then was as much a cynical political ploy as 
*RUGRQ%URZQ¶VHOHYHQWKKRXUFRQYHUVLRQWRWKHYLUWXHVRIthat electoral system. There are vices 
as well as virtues to be found in all electoral systems (for example, see Farrell, 2011) but a 
perception of cynical political intrigue would be exacerbated by the amount of negativity 
HPDQDWLQJIURPERWKWKHµ\HV¶DQGµQR¶FDPSDLJQV on theLURSSRQHQWV¶YLFHV; or what more 
accurately may be termed the stress placed upon µYLFHVE\SUR[\¶As we shall see in this section, 
the designated official campaign groupsµ<HVWR)DLUHU9RWHV¶DQGµ1RWR$9¶DSSHDUHGless 
interested in enlightening the public on the technical details of the competing electoral systems 
than emphasising the vices associated with individual politicians. This is important, if indeed not 
crucial, as the official groups who were ostensibly cross party entities, were in reality more the 
extended weapons of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. Firstly, no leading 
Conservatives1 campaigned for the Yes side and there were no Liberal Democrats advocating a 
No vote in the referendum. There were prominent Labour party people connected to both of the 
official campaign groups but in the main these were to be found acting in a deputy role to the 
main players. For example, a vice chair of the Yes group was the comedian/actor Eddie Izzard, 
ZKRKDGµIURQWHG¶some of the Labour parW\¶VHOHFWLRQEURDGFDVWVRI. And, Joan Ryan, an 
erstwhile vice chair of the Labour party, was a deputy campaign director for the No side. But, 
essentially the foremost spokespersons of these campaign groups would be strongly associated 
with the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats and importantly, the funding for both groups 
would similarly be overly dependent on such connections. 
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From early in the campaign the No group placed great emphasis upon the Lib Dem connections 
to the Yes side, claiming that five out of six members of the Yes steering committee had worked 
for or supported the Liberal Democrat party in the recent past (Wintour and Watt, 2011). The 
Chair of the Yes campaign group, Katie Ghose, was the chief executive of the Electoral Reform 
Society (ERS), which of course shared many of the Liberal Democrat aims for electoral reform. 
And, along with one of the leading contributors of funds for the Lib Dems, the Joseph Rowntree 
Reform Trust (JRRT), the ERS contributed £909,517 to the designated Yes campaign group, 
which was just short of the largest donation of £951,000 by the JRRT itself. To put this in 
perspective, these two donations would amount to 87 per cent of the Yes JURXS¶V total 
expenditure (Electoral Commission, 2012, p. 35). Moreover, the lead advertising agency 
employed by the Yes side was the Iris agency, with the Independent newspaper reporting that Iris 
had landed the Yes contract after winning plaudits for its work for the Liberal Democrats at the 
last election, particularly with its mocking of the similarities of the two major parties as the 
µ/DEVHUYDWLYHV¶0DUFK 2011). Conversely, that newspaper also reported that the No 
campaign group had hired the Edinburgh ad agency, µFamily¶, which previously had contracts 
with the Scottish Tories (ibid). And, whether it was the Tory master tactician, Stephen Gilbert, 
WDNLQJHIIHFWLYHFRQWURORIWKH1RFDPSDLJQZKLOHWKHSDUW\¶VFR-chair Lord Feldman mobilised 
the party donors (Coates and Asthana, 2011), or it was the Media Intelligence Partners agency, 
with its strong links to the Conservative party and its representation on behalf of right wing 
groups that had turned the campaign around to the benefit of the No side (Scotland on Sunday 1 
May 2011), there was no doubting the strong connections between the Conservative party and 
the official No campaign group. The Guardian UHYHDOHGWKHH[WHQWRIµ7RU\PRQH\¶WKDWZDV
funding the No to AV campaign (3 May 2011) and we should note that Matthew Elliot, its 
Campaign Director, who was the founder of the neo-liberal pressure group, µ7D[SD\HUV¶
Alliance¶, was also a contributor to the Conservative Home website. Interestingly, after the 
success of the No campaign there was a strong rumour in Westminster that Elliott would be 
DSSRLQWHGDV'DYLG&DPHURQ¶VGLUHFWRURIVWUDWHJ\RQWKHGHSDUWXUHRI6WHYH+LOWRQVHHWKH
Guardian and Telegraph 19 April 2012). Little wonder then that the Liberal Democrat Minister 
Chris Huhne, a month before the actual vote, could accuse the No campaign of being a front for 
the Conservative party (The Observer 3 April 2011).  
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Of course, the AV referendum campaign was held in a period of austerity, with a rather impaired 
state of the economy. However, one full year into coalition government and Labour was still 
perceived as being mostly to blame for the economic malaise (for example, see the New 
Statesman 26 May 2011). In addition, the referendum was part of a package of political reform 
that was deemed necessary by the coalition to address the issue of parliamentarians being held in 
such low regard by the public (for example, see Hay, 2007 and Stoker, 2006 for an examination 
of such trends); with trust in politicians at depressed levels in light of the expenses scandals and 
other assorted stories of sleaze. The aim of such government actions was to enhance the 
transparency of government and parliament and to establish greater accountability of 
parliamentarians (HM Government, 2010, pp. 26-28). In this instance though, the state of the 
economy and government actions would not be facilitators RIµYRODWLOLW\¶ by moving the 
campaign towards the right hand side of Figure 1 and thus aiding an open and thorough 
examination of the issue of the UK voting system but would in effect, be subsumed in what 
became campaign warfare between the groups, parties and leaders of the Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats. If anything the state of the economy, or who was to blame for it, helped the 
Conservatives and the issue of trust was to be quickly utilised as a weapon against the Liberal 
Democrats DQGE\DVVRFLDWLRQDJDLQVWDµ\HVYRWH¶. Thus, the campaign itself highlighted 
predisposed party positions and would resemble the negativity of an election campaign.  
 
Yet it all began ever so brightly for the Yes campaign with polls indicating a considerable lead 
over the No side; by an average of ten percentage points in February 2011 (Qvortrup, 2012, p. 
114). The major theme of the Yes campaign was predicated upon resentment towards the 
expenses scandals2. It made the claim that AV µwould make your MP work harder¶ as it would 
put an end to safe seats and that it would lessen the occurrence of such scandals as MPs would be 
less likely to abuse their expenses if they had to get half of the people in their area to support 
them. As we will see below, current and former MPs bitterly resented this approach and such 
tenuous causation was to be an easy target for the opponents of AV, with The Times viewing the 
delicious irony of a campaign that promised fresh air and sunlight and more honesty in politics 
by deploying such dishonest arguments (19 April 2011). There was a similar irony to be had in 
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WKH/LEHUDO'HPRFUDWVDFFXVLQJ/DERXURIµVWXGHQWSROLWLFV¶ZLWK(G0LOLEDQGUHfusing to share 
a platform with Nick Clegg (more of which in the following section), while the first Yes to AV 
campaign broadcast seemed the epitome of the worst kind of puerile student politics. In this 
bizarre campaign broadcast a series of younger looking voters abuse a number of MPs, who are 
presented as lazy, duplicitous and corrupt, by shouting at them via a loudhailer; the most 
eccentric of which has the woman MP being abused in this way by a young man from a passing 
car (see BBC News, 12 April, 2011). Early in the campaign the Yes side basked in the celebrity 
endorsement of two of the stars of the hit movie, 7KH.LQJ¶V6SHHFKThese actors, Helena 
Bonham-Carter and Colin Firth, were viewed as prominent Liberal Democrats but Firth qualified 
his support E\VD\LQJµWKDWWKHFRDOLWLRQ¶VVSHQGLQJFXWVPHDQWKHFRXOGQRORQJHUJLYHWKHSDUW\
KLVEDFNLQJ¶%%C News, 15 February 2011). 
 
We will see that the No campaign would exploit ruthlessly this unpopularity of the Liberal 
Democrat party, particularly by pOD\LQJWKHµ&OHJJ&DUG¶ but it also effectively utilised issue 
ownership of the argument for economic rectitude in the µFOLPDWHRIDXVWHULW\¶ Mindful of the 
state of the economy, there was an extremely effective alarmist theme of the µPLOOLRQUHDO
FRVWRI$9¶with the deployment also of a sub set of µRSSRUWXQLW\FRVW¶ posters that pictured a 
variety of cases, one was of DQROGDJHSHQVLRQHUZLWKWKHFDSWLRQµVKHQHHGVKRPHKHOSQRWDQ
DOWHUQDWLYHYRWLQJV\VWHP¶RUWKHLOOEDE\LQDQLQFXEDWRUWKDWQHHGHGµDQHZFDUGLDFIDFLOLW\¶not 
AV or indeed the soldier who would benefit more by satisfying his need for µbulletproof vests¶. 
Instructive, in terms of reinforcing that movement towards the left hand side of our conceptual 
map in Figure 1, David Blunkett, the former Labour Home Secretary, on the day of the 
referendum admitted that the £250 million claim was an example of an exaggeration that was 
common to all elections but that undoubtedly AV would cost more, he believed that this would 
be in the region of £90 million (The Times 5 May 2011). The No side had calculated the £250 
million cost of an alternative electoral system on the need for sophisticated electronic counting 
machines due to the complexities of multiple-choice voting slips; and not for the first time Chris 
Huhne, the then Energy and Climate Change Minister, intervened with an extraordinary threat to 
VXHKLVIHOORZ&DELQHWPHPEHUVRYHUZKDWKHWHUPHGWKHVHµXQWUXWKV¶Sunday Telegraph 1 May 
2011). Such coalition ruptures were exacerbated by Chancellor George Osborne echoing the No 
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side allegation that of course the providers of these electronic machines would benefit, namely 
the Electoral Reform Society. He voiced the opinion that the link between the ERS and the Yes 
FDPSDLJQµUHDOO\VWLQNV¶DQGWKDWLWZDVjust such behind the scenes dodgy shenanigans that 
undermined the trust in politics and politicians (see The Independent 14 April 2011). However, 
when that issue of trust was unambiguously directed at the Liberal Democrats, the rising level of 
rancour and enmity between the coalition partners was clear for all to see; particularly in relation 
to the character assassination of Nick Clegg. 
 
Of course, at the 2010 generDOHOHFWLRQ&OHJJ¶VSRSXODULW\KDGVRDUHGLQOLQHZLWKKLV
performances in the television debates. Adding further weight to the candidate centric 
personalisation of politics thesis for the UK (Mughan, 2000; Poguntke and Webb, 2005), 
µ&OHJJPDQLD¶KDGVHHQKis approval rating reach an almost unprecedented post war level of 72 
per cent, with only Churchill being more popular on 83 per cent. In the TV debates Clegg 
portrayed himself as the representative of a new politics of trust and exploited the national mood 
RIDQJHURYHUWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\H[SHQVHVVFDQGDOZLWKUHIHUHQFHVWRWKHFXOSDELOLW\RIWKHµROG
SDUWLHV¶ (Seawright, 2012). But, just one year on and we see just how fickle such popularity 
based on the personalisation approach to politics can be, the Liberal Democrats had lost nigh on 
ten per cent of its vote, while the net approval rating for Clegg was now at rock bottom levels on 
minus 18 per cent (The Guardian 20 June 2011). This precipitous fall in the level of µWUXVW¶IRU 
Clegg and the Lib Dems was due to the putative volt face on policy when forming the coalition; 
inter alia, accepting an increase in VAT and the reduction of public spending levels but most 
damaging of all was the increase in university tuition fees with so many Lib Dems previously 
photographed with a µSOHGJHWRYRWHDJDLQVWDQ\LQFUHDVHLQIHHV¶Early in the campaign, the 
person who ran the successful No to the North East Assembly campaign believed that the No 
side should be all over Clegg if they wanted WRZLQDVKHZDVµDVVRFLDWHGZLWKHYHU\WKLQJWKDW
SHRSOHFXUUHQWO\GLVWUXVWDERXWSROLWLFLDQV,WPD\EHXQIDLUEXWWKDWLVUHDOLW\¶%%&1HZV
February, 2011). And, the No to AV campaign was to UHVROXWHO\SURVHFXWHVXFKDµUHDOLW\¶ 
 
11 
 
The No side made sure that the issue of the Alternative Vote would inextricably be linked to 
those perceived failings of Nick Clegg, indeed a huge part of the No to AV publicity was by way 
of the µunwitting SUR[\¶RI1LFN&OHJJ+HDSSHDUHGRQPuch of the literature and leaflets. For 
example, there was the almost ubiquitous picture of Clegg holding the SOHGJHIRUµ)XQGLQJ2XU
Future¶ which of course was not to raise tuition fees and usually an attendant claim was one of 
µ$9OHDGVWREURNHQSURPLVHV¶. And, WKHUHZDVWKHFODLPWKDWµ$9ZRXOGOHDGWRPRUHKXQJ
parliaments and backroom deals, this time the picture was of Clegg patting Cameron on the back 
as they entered Number 10 Downing Street but as he does so Clegg looks back to the camera 
with what appears to be a knowing, guileful expression. Another humorous presentation in poster 
and leaflet form was the use of the newspaper front page headline - one uncannily similar to the 
Guardian ± that declared: µQHZYRWLQJV\VWHPVDYHV3UHVLGHQW&OHJJ/LE'HPSROl collapse 
RIIVHWE\$9JDLQV¶DTXHVWLRQRYHUWKHIXWXUHXQGHU$9LVWKHQDQVZHUHGZLWKµGRQ¶WOHWWKH/LE
'HPVRIIWKHKRRN¶Moreover, in contrast to the rather amateurish first campaign broadcast from 
the Yes side, the No campaign¶VZDV far more professional, utilising Rik MayDOO¶V$ODQ%¶6WDUG
creation. This Thatcherite but subsequently New Labour character, who acknowledges no 
boundaries to the pursuit of power, is filmed on the stump making a series of outrageous election 
promises, one of which of coXUVHµLVQRPRUHWXLWLRQIHHV¶ before later being seen to throw the 
PDQLIHVWRLQDILUHZLWKWKHTXLSWKDWµZLWK$9HYHQLIWKH\GRQ¶WYRWHIRUPH,¶OOSUREDEO\JHW
LQ¶. 6XFKDVFHQDULRLVWKHQUHLQIRUFHGE\WKH1RVLGH¶VRIW-repeated imagery of the puzzlement 
engendered by the person finishing third in a race actually being declared the winner (see BBC 
News, 12 April, 2011). In the candidate centric, personalised campaigns of the United States the 
reasons for the dominance of such negative campaigning are fully understood (Jameison, 1992). 
Negative advertisements are more effective as they are more memorable in the sense that people 
process negative information more deeply and as they are usually more creative, with an added 
spice, people want to see them again. But importantly, they are usually also humorous as 
laughter is not only disarming making negative messages more powerful but it helps to avoid a 
backlash from the electorate for such negativity in the first place (Devlin, 1995, pp. 198-199). It 
seems apparent that the No campaign team were well aware of the utility of their negative 
approach.  
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However, the Liberal Democrats were less than amused, with some even incandescent with rage. 
When the Conservative Chairman, Baroness Warsi, claimed that AV would lead to mainstream 
parties pandering to extremists like the British National Party (BNP), Chris Huhne accused his 
fellow Cabinet member of descending into Goebbels like propaganda. But, in an even more 
astonishing break wiWK&DELQHWHWLTXHWWHKHWRRNWKH1RWR$9µ1LFN&OHJJOHDIOHWV¶WR&DELQHW
and demanded that the Prime Minister and Chancellor disassociate themselves from them. The 
Chancellor, George Osborne, reminded him that it was a Cabinet meeting and thus the subject 
was not appropriate for it, that Cabinet was QRWDIRUXPIRUµsome sub--HUHP\3D[PDQLQWHUYLHZ¶
(The Times 4 May 2011). As is the way of %ULWLVKSDUW\SROLWLFV+XKQH¶V publicly reported 
exasperation was interpreted as a bid for the Lib Dem leadership but there is no doubting the 
enthusiasm, if rather effusive, with which he previously approached the subject at the time of the 
coalition negotiations. µChris Huhne, however, argued that the AV prize was worth taking a risk 
IRU³5HPHPEHULIZHVHFXUH$9WKLVZLOOEHDGUDPDWLFEUHDNWKURXJKLQWKHKLVWRU\RIWKH
SDUW\´¶/DZVSLeading Liberal Democrats were also furious with David Cameron 
for reneging on a deal that would have seen both him and Nick Clegg keeping a very low profile 
in the campaign. But, Cameron had to face the fury of his own backbenchers and after a meeting 
of the 1922 Committee he was left in no doubt that his own position as leader could be in doubt 
LIWKHYRWHZHQWWKHRWKHUZD\µ´6KRUWWHUPPDUULDJHVRIFRQYHQLHQFHZLWKWKH/LE'HPVZHUH
QRWFRQVLGHUHGLPSRUWDQWHQRXJKWRDOORZFKDQJHVWRWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQWRJRWKURXJK´RQHRI
WKRVHSUHVHQWUHFDOOV¶&RDWHVDQG$VWKDQDUndoubtedly, Cameron acknowledged this 
level of 1922 concern, with there being little coincidence that he would later become a very 
effective campaigner on behalf of the No vote and that he did turn a blind eye to the personal 
attacks on Clegg. Reassurance may have been given to Huhne, at the Cabinet table, that Cameron 
RQO\KDGUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHµ&RQVHUYDWLYHQRFDPSDLJQ¶DQGQRWIRUWKHDFWLRQVRIWKHRIILFLDO
campaign group (The Times 4 May 2011) but publicity material bearing the Conservative tree 
logo was jXVWDVUXWKOHVVLQH[SORLWLQJWKHµLVVXHRI&OHJJ¶7RFKRRVHMXVWRQHLQVWDQFHIURP
PDQ\WKHUHZDVWKHµDOWHUQDWLYHFRPHG\¶SRVWHUWKDWKLODULRXVO\FDULFDWXUHG&OHJJDV7RPP\
Cooper garbed in the obligatory fez with the rhetorical caption of µ:KDWDMRNH¶, one that would 
have $9µencourage a future of weak governments¶see The Independent 14 April 2011). The 
irony was not lost on leading Lib Dems in the Cabinet with Vince Cable, in light of the actual 
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YRWHFDOOLQJWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHVµUXWKOHVVFDOFXODWLQJDQGWKRURXJKO\WULEDO¶Sunday Telegraph 8 
May 2011).  
 
Lib Dem naivety is manifestly encapsulated in such a statement, as Conservative strategists in 
gauging the effectiveness of their own electoral machine would most likely accept such remarks 
as complimentary. But, the evidential account as delineated above leaves no doubt to the extent 
of acrimony and bitterness held between the coalition partners in the AV campaign; between the 
parties, their leaders and the campaign groups with their close bonds to each party. Such 
predisposed party positions left less scope for uncertainty in the campaign itself and clearly 
GHPRQVWUDWHGµWKHVHHOHPHQWV¶PRYLQJLQH[RUDEO\WRZDUGVWKHOHIWKDQGVLGHRIRXUFRQFHSWXDO
map. However, with the positions of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat elements clearly 
demarcated, that of the Labour party would be pivotal and this is examined in the following 
section. 
 
Pivotal Party 
 
Of the three main parties the Labour party was the only one who, in their 2010 general election 
manifesto, had actually advocated the introduction of AV: however exiguous the references to it 
may have been (Labour Party, 2010). Crucially though, the Party and the labour movement were 
unquestionably split on the issue with a majority firmly ensconced in the NO camp. The month 
prior to the actual vote The Times UDQZLWKWKHIURQWSDJHKHDGOLQHµ/DERXUVSOLWDV03VUHYROW
RYHUYRWLQJUHIRUP¶ZLWK'DYLG%OXQNHWWFODLPLQJWKDWWKHµ1RFDPSDLJQKDGWKHVXSSRUWRIIRXU
out of five Labour councillors, thousands of party activists and 131 MPs, a majority of Mr 
0LOLEDQG¶VVWURQJ SDUOLDPHQWDU\SDUW\¶$SULO 2011). And, importantly, the Labour MPs 
who had bothered to declare their allegiance to the Yes side did so with a less than enthusiastic 
display RIVXSSRUWZLWKHYHQWKH/DERXUOHDGHU(G0LOLEDQGOLVWLQJKLVSULRULWLHVDVµHOHFWLRQVWR
English councils, the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh assembly and then ± and only then ± $9¶
(ibid). It was also reported that most trade union leaders would campaign to keep the first past 
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the post system (BBC News, 11 March, 2011). The effect and extent of this split is reflected in 
the fact that the Labour party did not register as a permitted participant (Electoral Commission, 
2011b, p. 99), and as a party did not spend anything on the campaign; compare this to the 
expenditure of £660,785 by the Conservatives and £62,782 for the Lib Dems (Electoral 
&RPPLVVLRQ3IRRWQRWHIRUµFDPSDLJQHUVSHQGLQJ¶However, the organisations 
µ/DERXU1RWR$9¶DQGµ/DERXU<HV¶UHJLVWHUHGDVSHUPLWWHGSDUWLFLSDQWV7KHµLabour No to 
AV¶ expenditure was £192,084 but remarkably, like the Labour party itselfµ/DERXU<HV¶did not 
spend anything which is rather indicative of the level of commitment to the cause; indeed, again 
in comparison WKHQHDULQYLVLEOHµ&RQVHUYDWLYH<HV¶FDPSDLJQJURXSFRXOGPDQDJHWRVSHQG
£6576 (ibid). But more problematic for the Yes campaign, than the level of Labour expenditure 
or the half-hearted commitment of some of its MPs, was the refusal of the Labour leader to share 
a platform with Nick Clegg. 
 
As leader of one of the two largest parties, Ed Miliband would be a key element of the Yes 
campaign. However, by declaring that Clegg could not help win the referendum and that 
consequently he would not share a platform with him merely affirmed the No campaign theme of 
duplicity. On 15 March, Miliband withdrew from a Yes to Fairer Votes event when Clegg 
insisted on taking part; with Miliband statingµ:KDWLVWKHSUREOHPZLWK1LFN&OHJJ":KHUHGo 
you start? He was the person who promised new politics. And the brief bout of Cleggmania there 
ZDVZDVVXSSRVHGWREHDERXWQHZSROLWLFV,¶PDIUDLGKHKDVEHFRPHWKHH[HPSODURIROG
SROLWLFVRIEUHDNLQJ\RXUSURPLVHV¶The Independent 15 March 2011). The counter claim by a 
/LE'HPVRXUFHWKDWWKLVZDVµVWXGHQWSROLWLFV¶LELGXQGRXEWHGO\KLJKOLJKWHGWKHGLYLVLRQVLQ
the Yes camp and of course at subsequent events, whichever leading Liberal Democrat was 
present on the platform with Miliband, be it Vince Cable, Charles Kennedy, Tim Farron or Chris 
Huhne, the story would inevitably be focused on the one who was missing. Indeed, the No side 
had some great fun with this, sending along to such events a group with Nick Clegg facemasks to 
hold aloft placards wLWKWKHSOHDµ/HWPHLQ± LW¶VP\UHIHUHQGXP¶ Rachel Sylvester criticised 
0LOLEDQG¶VEHKDYLRXU IRUµQRWULVLQJDERYHWKHWUDGLWLRQDOSDUW\WULEHV¶ZKLFKDGGVZHLJKWWRWKH
claim that the campaign resolutely reflected more the partisan politics at the left hand side of our 
spectrum in Figure1 than the actual question of changing the electoral system. She also reported 
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that Miliband had reneged on a promise to stand alongside Clegg to promote the cause of voting 
reform (Sylvester, 2011). To paraphrase Wilde, it may have been regarded as a misfortune for 
Clegg to have one of the other leaders renege on a promise but to have them both looks more like 
carelessness. ,IWKHµ/DERXU<HV¶FDPSDLJQZDVWRKDYHWKLVVHQVHRIDPELYDOHQFHWKHµ/DERXU
1RWR$9¶ evinced no such ambiguity, mercilessly associating AV with the pledges Nick Clegg 
failed to keep. 
 
The Labour No campaiJQDGRSWHGDOOWKHµSLFWRULDO QDUUDWLYHV¶RI&OHJJthat were utilised by the 
official No campaign group, stressing that AV would lead to more hung parliaments and 
EDFNURRPGHDOVDQGZLWKWKHPPRUHEURNHQSURPLVHVVRWKHPHVVDJHZDVFOHDUµWHOO1LFN&OHJJ
1R¶%XWWKHUHZDVDOVRWKHOX[XU\RIa full frontal assault on the coalition per se and in this 
approach the leading Lib Dems were presented alongside Cameron and Osborne. The line taken 
was that Clegg, Cable and Huhne were responsible for propping up a Tory led government and 
thus were responsible for the increase in VAT to 20 per cent and for the increase in tuition fees 
to £9,000, along with the scrapping of the educational maintenance allowance; which for the 
Labour No campaign unequivocally rubbished DQ\FODLPE\WKH/LE'HPVWREHµSURJUHVVLYH¶
Conversely, the Labour politicians on the No side showed no reluctance to share a platform with 
leading Conservatives in defence of the first past the post system. One of the most prominent of 
these events was on the 18 April when David Cameron and the erstwhile Labour Cabinet 
minister, John Reid, displayed a very effective double act which reached right across the class 
divide. Reid, as the Labour working class street fighter was a perfect foil for Cameron and in his 
speech he effectively undermined much of the specious argument for AV; inter alia humorously 
pointing out that he was yet WRVHHDQ\RIWKRVH03VDGYRFDWLQJ$9VWHSIRUZDUGWRVD\WKH\¶UH
the one who is not working hard enough (Sky News, 18 April 2011). ,QVWDUNFRQWUDVWDWµD
parallel event in Westminster by the pro-AV campaign, Mr Miliband conceded that other issues 
mattered more than AV. He was standing alongside Vince Cable, the Lib Dem Business 
Secretary, who watched as Mr MilibaQGDWWDFNHG1LFN&OHJJDVD³YRWHORVHU´IRUWKHFDPSDLJQ¶
(The Times 19 April 2011). 
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With the Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties, and their leaders, firmly entrenched on 
each side of the debate, Ed Miliband¶V and the Labour SDUW\¶VSRVLWLRQZould be pivotal to the 
outcome of the referendum. Typical levels of electoral support for the parties would mean the 
Yes side needed a considerable share of the Labour support to be successful. But, in an academic 
survey LWZDVFOHDUWKDWµEHLQJD&RQVHUYDWLYHLGHQWLILHUUHGXFHGWKHOLNHOLKRRGRID<HVYRWH
whereas identifying with the Liberal Democrats increased it. Also, and perhaps indicative of the 
divisions within the party, Labour identifiers were less likely than non-identifiers WRYRWH\HV¶ 
(Whiteley et al, 2012, p. 314). Undoubtedly, for Labour as well as for the Conservatives and the 
Liberal Democrats, the campaign reflected partisan cues in terms of movement towards the left 
hand side of the continuum in Figure 1; indeed, a post referendum analysis by the Liberal 
Democrats was in no doubt that the campaign allowed Labour µWRNLFNWKHSDUW\WZLFH¶/LEHUDO
Democrats, 2011, p. 7). To this end this article has demonstrated the inherent partisan nature of 
the campaign debate in each of the elements: the official campaign groups, the parties and their 
leaders. With the remaining campaign element of the media in mind, the next section gauges by 
how much it was a forum within which balanced judgements could be developed on the actual 
issue of electoral reform or the extent to which it would merely mirror those partisan positions.  
 
Crystallising Agendas: The Media 
 
In studies of campaign news a theoretical distinction between a sacerdotal and pragmatic 
approach is often applied (see de Vreese and Semetko, 2004, pp. 67-69). The sacerdotal 
approach is one of viewing the campaign as fundamental to the democratic polity and thus the 
coverage is considered newsworthy per se with a respectful attitude taken towards the political 
participants, whereas in a pragmatic approach the coverage has to be evaluated against 
conventional news selection and the campaign is not automatically given special attention (ibid, 
p. 68). The media approach in the AV referendum campaign was one of pragmatism, with other 
news stories considered more newsworthy than politicians squabbling over an issue of little 
public interest. Whiteley et al show that only small numbers of people monitored the campaign 
closely, with only 8 per cent paying a great deal of attention to the campaign in newspapers and 
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10 per cent on television or radio (2012, p. 311). And, what is not in doubt is the level of 
QHJDWLYLW\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHFDPSDLJQSHUFHQWDJUHHGWKDWWKHUHZDVDµORWRIPXG-
VOLQJLQJ¶ZLWKRQO\SHr cent disagreeing (ibid, p. 317). Of course, in the UK the broadcast 
media are expected to abide by their charters in implementing a policy of impartiality and 
political balance but there is no such requirement of the printed press. It is therefore possible, in 
examining the editorial approach of the newspapers, to gauge the extent to which we can confirm 
or refute the idea that the referendum campaign was indeed more a reflection of the existing 
political divide than any process of educating and informing the public on the actual merits of 
competing electoral systems. And, in Table 1 the partisan basis of the campaign is demonstrated 
E\DFRPSDULVRQRIWKHQHZVSDSHU¶VGHFODUHGVWDQFHRQWKHUHIHUHQGXPZLWKLWVSDUWLVDQVKLSDW
the previous general election.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
From Table 1 it is immediately apparent that there is a very strong correlation with a national 
QHZVSDSHU¶VHQGRUVHPHQWRIWKH/LEHUDO'HPRFUats or Conservatives at the 2010 general election 
and its respective declared support for a Yes or No vote in the referendum campaign. The left-
liberal press who endorsed the Liberal Democrat party in 2010 unanimously encouraged its 
readers to vote for a change to the electoral system in 2011. Conversely, there is near unanimous 
support for a No vote from the Conservative supporting newspapers of 2010. The only deviation 
is that of the Financial Times but this pro-European newspaper was certainly not typical of the 
Tory press and it had supported the Labour party at the previous four general elections prior to 
2010. The Trinity 0LUURU*URXSQHZVSDSHUV¶FRPPLWPHQWWR/DERXUDWHOHFWLRQWLPHLVlong 
standing and DOWKRXJKERWKSDSHUVGHFODUHGIRUDµ\HVYRWH¶ they also exhibited the ambivalent 
approach of a divided Labour party. For example, on the day before the actual referendum the 
Daily Mirror opined that if it had its way there would be no referendum as there were more 
important issues to be addressed; before proceeding to attack Nick Clegg for broken promises 
but the real target appeared WREH&DPHURQZKRZDQWHGDµµ1R¶EHFDXVHKHNQRZVDµ<HV¶ZRXOG
brand him a double-loser after failing to win the General Election outright¶0D\. By no 
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stretch of the imagination then could this be accepted as a fulsome endorsement of a Yes vote. 
And of the newspapers on the Yes side The Mirror and Sunday Mirror had the most impressive 
circulation and readership figures but even with them they were still dwarfed by those Tory 
supporting papers that were resolutely committed to a No vote. De Vreese makes the point that a 
referendum campaign is potentially more unpredictable if the journalists involved, in respect to 
party positioning, may not be clear on the parameters of the two camps (2007, p. 13). But the 
evidence from Table 1 clearly shows once again, this time in relation to the newspaper element, 
WKDWWKHµFDPSDLJQ movement¶LV away from unpredictability and volatility towards the left hand 
side of 'H/XF¶V conceptual map; as the journalists were indeed fully cognizant of the parameters 
of the two camps in the AV referendum campaign.  
 
The reporting of the campaign by the broadcast media may well have been impartial but if the 
negative stories are the ones that catch the eye then those are the ones that will be prioritised by 
the broadcast news; in effect crystallising partisan agendas. For example, it would be almost 
LPSRVVLEOHIRUDQ\QHZVRXWOHWWRLJQRUHVXFKVWRULHVVXJJHVWLYHRIDµ1D]LVOXU¶SDUWLFXODUZKHQ
&DELQHWPHPEHUVDLPWKHPDWHDFKRWKHU7KHUHZDVWKHµEHQHILWWRWKH%13¶/µGoebbels like 
EHKDYLRXU¶URZEHWZHHQ:DUVLDQG+XKQHDQGODWHU1LFN&OHJJZRXOGFRPSDUHWKH7RULHVWRWKH
%13ZKLOHFULWLFLVLQJµWKHYHU\QDVWLHVWUHDFWLRQDU\SROLWLFV¶RIWKH1RFDPSDLJQThe Times 25 
$SULO%XWLWZRXOGEHWKHµ<HVWR)DLUHU9RWHV¶VLGHwho would utilise a poster of the 
%13OHDGHUZLWKWKHFDSWLRQµ6D\1RWRWKH%13YRWH<HVRQ0D\th¶And, even the Liberal 
'HPRFUDWVDFNQRZOHGJHGWKHVKRUWFRPLQJVRIWKH<HVFDPSDLJQµWKH³SHRSOHYVSROLWLFLDQV´
approach alienated politicians and actiYLVWVDQGIDLOHGWRUHVRQDWHZLWKWKHEURDGFDVWHUV¶/LEHUDO
Democrats, 2011, p. 7). The BBC reported the backlash from a number of Labour MPs who felt 
insulted and angry at the way MPs were portrayed as lazy and corrupt (BBC News, 14 April, 
2011). The comments from Jim Dowd, a former Labour whip, are indicative of how such an 
approach backfired ZKHQKHVWDWHGWKDWµKHZDVJRLQJWREDFN$9EXWQRZZRXOGQRWDIWHUD
³<HV´FDPSDLJQOHDIOHWVXJJHVWHGWKDW$9ZDVUHTXLUHGWRHQG:HVWPLQVWHUFRUUXSWLRQ¶The 
Times 27 April 2011). Moreover, there was just so much more conventional news selection that 
ZRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGPRUHQHZVZRUWK\DQGWKXVLQDµSUDJPDWLFDSSURDFK¶would displace the 
AV campaign from the headlines and undermine any claim on its behalf for special attention. 
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The Liberal Democrats or the Yes campaign could not legislate for the Christchurch and then 
Japan earthquakes and the effects of the tsunami on the nuclear reactors which received the 
greater share of media attention through February and April nor indeed for the killing of Osama 
Bin Laden by the Americans which would be the prime news item for the days leading up to the 
UHIHUHQGXPYRWH%XWRQHFRXOGEHDZDUHRIWKH5R\DO:HGGLQJRIµ:LOOLDPDQG.DWH¶WKH
weekend before the vote, as this was confirmed the previous November and yet the Liberal 
Democrats pushed for a date for the referendum which would clash with one of the most 
newsworthy and traditionalist of constitutional ceremonies and which was in reality a gift for the 
side advocating µNo to change¶Thus, like many other aspects of the referendum campaign as 
RXWOLQHGDERYHWKH/LE'HPVPLVMXGJHGLWVµSUDJPDWLFQDWXUH¶DQGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHPHGLD
would crystallise partisan agendas. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the aftermath of a lamentable campaign, the Liberal Democrats launched an official enquiry 
and moved to distance themselves from what was describeGDVDµOLYLQJQLJKWPDUH¶7KH3DUW\¶V
SUHVLGHQW7LP)DUURQVDLGµ&OHDUO\ZHZHUHQRWLQWRWDOFRQWURORIWKH<HVFDPSDLJQEXWLWLV
cleDUOHVVRQVKDYHWREHOHDUQW¶The Guardian 28 June 2011). But, the evidence presented in this 
article strongly suggests lessons could have been learnt beforehand from the elements in Le 
'XF¶VFRQFHSWXDOPDSand with the necessary foresight many of the pitfalls that ensnared the 
Liberal Democrats and the Yes campaign, particularly in relation to timing of the campaign and 
the SUHGLFWDELOLW\RIWKHPHGLD¶VSUDJPDWLFDSSURDFKcould have been avoided. There appeared 
the unnecessary rush to hold the referendum as quickly as possible with one leading 
Conservative dismissing Lib Dem complaints of the campaign ZLWKWKHVWDWHPHQWµ:HJDYH
WKHPWKHUHIHUHQGXPZHJDYHWKHPWKHGDWHWKH\DVNHGIRU¶The Guardian 6 May 2011). Such 
haste could be discerned in the coalition negotiDWLRQVµ%ut the issue for us was what our bottom-
line negotiating position should be. And the majority of us believed that voting reform had to be 
NH\WRDQ\FRDOLWLRQDJUHHPHQW¶/DZVS,WZDVWKRXJKWWKDWKROGLQJWKHUHIHUHQGXP
on the same day as the local DQGµGHYROYHG¶elections would boost turnout but as with events like 
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the Royal Wedding, this merely added to the pragmatic nature of a campaign which lost the 
special attention needed for an issue which did not rank high in YRWHUV¶SULRULWLHV$QGFUXFLDOO\
we saw that the media merely crystallised what was in effect existing partisan agendas. 
 
De Vreese emphasised that in the planning of national referendum campaigns the political parties 
faced internal strategic choices about who would be visible in the campaign as such personalities 
µPRVWO\FRPHZLWKWKHLURZQFRQQRWDWLRQVEHWKH\SRVLWLYHRUQHJDWLYH¶ (2007, p. 10). By the 
time the Referendum Bill passed through the House of Commons it must have been apparent 
even to the Liberal Democrats that their party¶V and particularly Nick Clegg¶Vlevels of 
unpopularity would be µa negaWLYH¶IRUWKH<HVVLGH and yet still they pushed for an early vote. 
Undoubtedly the No to AV side ran a more efficient and effective campaign which may be 
discerned in the amount of literature that was mailed µfree of charge¶ by the Royal Mail for both 
campaigns. The total expenditure by the lead No campaign group was £2.6m compared to the 
Yes group expenditure of £2.1m but remarkably the cost of free mailings as billed by the Royal 
Mail was £6.7m for the No campaign compared to just £1.5m for the Yes campaign (Electoral 
Commission, 2012, pp. 35 and 37). And, although it was highly unlikely that many voters would 
be ignorant of where Nick Clegg stood in the campaign, the Guardian reported that in a poll a 
day before the actual vote only 25 per cent of voters knew which way Eddie Izzard, the Yes 
FDPSDLJQ¶s most high-profile celebrity backer, intended to vote (4 May 2011). Of course, the No 
VLGH¶VPRUHHIIective message benefited from the partisan nature of the campaign divide. We 
have seen how the elements of the AV referendum campaign, the official groups, the parties, 
their leaders and the media, all suggested a reinforcement of a campaign located at the left hand 
side of the continuum of Figure 1, with the referendum debate increasingly being seen to reflect 
the concerns of the political parties and not an enlightenment of the merits of competing electoral 
systems. Indeed, the Liberal Democrats could havHEHHQDZDUHRI/H'XF¶Vearlier analyses and 
his prognosis that the most volatile referendum campaigns are likely to be those in which there is 
little partisan basis, where voters from the other side can be won over but if a campaign turns 
into a partisan fight it was usually the larger party that had the better chance of prevailing (2007, 
p. 41). In this sense the Labour party was pivotal to the referendum outcome but again, as 
outlined above, the Liberal Democrats could have foreseen the hostility towards Nick Clegg by 
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both the Labour Yes group as well as the Labour No campaign. And, with the bias towards the 
status quo in such plebiscites, before embarking upon an early referendum campaign the Liberal 
Democrats should have made themselves acquainted with the related prognostication, that:  
 
The political advantage in referendum campaigns too often seems to rest with the No 
side. Those opposed to a proposal do not necessarily have to make a coherent case 
against it. It is often enough simply to raise doubts about it in the minds of voters, 
question the motives of the proposers, play upon known fears, or attempt to link a 
proposal to other less popular issues or personalities (LeDuc, 2007, p. 42). 
 
Little wonder then that the Liberal Democrats have resolutely eschewed any notion of a 
referendum for the constitutional proposal to change the structure and composition of the House 
of Lords and there are also lessons to be learnt here for Conservative euro-sceptics with an eye to 
DQµLQ-RXW¶UHIHUHQGXPRQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ 
 
Figure and Table 
 
Figure 1. Elements of the 2011 AV Referendum campaign leading towards stability or 
volatility. 
 
  Stability                  Volatility 
 
Social cleavages                    Campaign events 
     Newspapers   Broadcast 
   Ideology       Campaign Groups     Media       Government actions 
  Core beliefs  Leaders          State of the economy 
  Political parties 
 
Source: adapted from Le Duc, 2002, p. 147. 
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Table 1 Declaration in Referendum, partisanship at 2010 general election and the 
circulation/readership of the national Daily and Sunday Newspapers. 
 
       Preferred winner   Circulation Readership 
    2011  2010       (000s)     (000s) 
 
Sun     No  Con      2,780     7,722 
News of the World  No  Con      2,617     7,455 
Mail    No  Con      1,938     4,775 
Mail on Sunday  No  Con      1,729     4,844 
Express   No  Con         613     1,488 
Sunday Express  No  Con         518     1,470 
Telegraph   No  Con         685     1,693 
Sunday Telegraph  No  Con         474     1,422 
Times    No  Con         445     1,504 
Sunday Times   No  Con         908     2,872 
 
Financial Times  Yes  Con         110        367 
 
Mirror    Yes  Lab      1,096     3,163 
Sunday Mirror  Yes  Lab      1,036     3,642 
Guardian   Yes  Lib Dem        253     1,154 
Observer   Yes  Lib Dem        289     1,081 
Independent   Yes  Lib Dem        158        562 
Independent on Sunday Yes  Lib Dem        127        518 
 
Source:  Figures for Circulation are from Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) May 2011 and readership figures are 
for the 12 months to March 2011 from the National Readership Survey, Press Gazette, 7 June 2011 and see 
Scammell and Becket (2010, pp. 281-282). 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 7KHUHZDVDµ&RQVHUYDWLYH<HV¶FDPSDLJQJURXSEXWLWZDVH[WUHPHO\VPDOOZLWKPDLQO\WKHVXSSRUWRIDIHZORFDO
councillors. It was registered as an unincorporated association with the Electoral Commission and it spent £6,576 in 
the campaign, see Electoral Commission, 2012, p. 33, footnote 44, for the campaigner spending at the referendum 
on the AV system. 
2
 See BBC News, for a full explanation of the 2009 expenses scandals which had an adverse political impact well 
into 2010 and beyond, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/uk_politics/2009/mps'_expenses/default.stm.  
